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REVISION OF BRITISH COMPANY LAW
By Mary E. Murphy*
The English Company Acts, revised at periodic intervals to
place limited liability enterprise under State scrutiny, have been
subjected to recent detailed criticism by a committee of inquiry
under Mr. Justice Cohen, a Judge of the King's Bench Division
of the Supreme Court of Judicature.' This Committee, composed
of distinguished members of the bar, economists, accountants and
business men, was appointed by the Board of Trade to consider
and report what major amendments were desirable in the Companies Act, 1929, and in particular to review the requirements prescribed in regard to the formation and affairs of companies and the
safeguards afforded investors and the public. Its report, published
in June 1945, has elicited wide comment in both Britain and
America as it provides one of the best reviews of traditional and
contemporary accounting and corporate practice in the former
country. In addition, the Committee proposes reforms, some conservative, others drastic, for blatantly outmoded or illegitimate business procedures, but it has skillfully avoided "placing unreasonable
fetters upon business which is conducted in an efficient and honest
mainer," while making sure that "as much information as is reason' '2
ably required shall be available to shareholders and the public.
The Labor Government has accepted the recommendations of
the Cohen Committee in full and is preparing a Bill to give effect
to them. Before this measure is introduced in Parliament, however,
companies are urged to bring their practices in line with the Committee's proposals, a suggestion which has been followed by a
number of prominent firms.
The Cohen Committee expresses satisfaction that the great majority of public and private limited liability companies is managed
honestly and of marked benefit to the nation's trade and industry.
The fullest practicable disclosure of information concerning the
activities of companies in its opinion will lessen the opportunity
for abuse and coincide with an aroused social consciousness. The
Amendment Committee's suggestions have been aimed at aiding
-Ph.D. (London) ; C. P. A.; Assistant Professor of Economics, Hunter
College of the City of New York.
'See Minutes of Evidence taken before Company Law Amendment
Committee,
London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1943, for details of this inquiry.
2
Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment, Cmd. 6659,
pp. 115.
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shareholders to exercise a more effective general control over the
management of their companies, although they indicate that this
aim will be attained "more by selection of the proper governing
body of each company than by the provisions of any statute."
A serious problem confronting the formulators of Company
Law is the dispersal of capital among an ever increasing number of
small shareholders who direct little attention to their investments.
English law has always assumed that the owners of a limited company's capital would take an active interest in their property, and
do all that could be expected of prudent men and women to safeguard their corporate interests and to exercise their joint controlling
powers to their firm's best advantage. Company Law has.succeeded
admirably in its function of tapping remote sources of capital and
channeling them into large vats for feeding the country's industry
and trade. But it has had to cope with the wide separation of
individual shareholders, the physical impossibility of bringing the
entire number or even a majority of shareholders together in one
place, the difficulty of creating and maintaining a corporate spirit
among the owners of corporate enterprises, the concentration in
company management of functions which were properly those of
proprietors but which were left unexercised, and the tendency on
the part of managements to provide the minimum of information
to stockholders who have shown little desire to utilize it. As a
means of improving this state of affairs the editor- of the Financial
News, in testimony, suggested the establishment of a new office,
under the Crown, of Public Shareholder, who would hold one
share in every company, and the organization of a Shareholders'
Advisory Committee and of Company Commissioners to maintain
regular contact with the board of directors on behalf of shareholders.
When the Consolidating Act was passed in 1862, 2,479 companies had registered under the 1856 Act which established the
principle of limited liability in England. 3 From that day forward,
the increase in the number of joint stock companies has been great
although in this development the major emphasis has been placed
upon the private rather than upon the public company from the
viewpoint of numbers if not from that of capital involved.4
3
Shaman, H. A., The Coming of General Limited Liability, Economic
History, January 1931, pp. 267-91.
4A private company restricts the right to transfer its shares, limits the
number of its members to fifty excluding persons in the employ of the
company, and prohibits an invitation to the public to subscribe for any
shares or debentures it may issue. In practice, a private company rarely
exceeds two to six members, and frequently consists of only the Promoter
and his wife or son or daughter.
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The rise of the English accounting profession is closely connected with the growth of limited liability companies. As the number
of such companies rose from 9,000 in 1885 with £482,000,000
paid-up capital to 182,500 in 1944 with £5,987,000,000 in paid-up
capital, auditors established professional societies, set up qualifying
examinations, and outlined standards of conduct.5 The correlation
of Company Law with company practice has become increasingly
complex and numerous bodies, including the Trade Union Congress, recognizing this dilemma, have suggested that provision be
made for a standing Consultative Committee to afford the Board
of Trade a continuous examination of the operation of the Act so
that any amendments required can be suggested and put into effect
with a minimum delay.
Modern accounting practice in relation to the form and presentation of reports and accounts far exceeds the standard prescribed by the Companies Act 1929, and professional accounting
societies have encouraged this tendency by every conceivable means. 6
There has been great agitation in the last ten years to subject the
profit and loss account to the same statutory requirements in regard to circulation, inspection and filing as the balance sheet, with
the additional obligation that the auditors' report should relate
not only to the balance sheet but also to this account. Some observers, in fact, have contended that private companies should be
required to publish an annual balance sheet and profit and loss
account, while others have emphasized that the law should provide
a standard form for financial statements of all companies and should
define some of the more important accounting terms used.7 The
Institute of Chartered Accountants, however, has continued to urge
maximum disclosure in accounts although holding out against
standardization of financial statements. Statutory guidance should
be extended to the profit and loss account, in its opinion, with
5
These data do not include debentures, bonds, mortgages and bank
loans as part of share capital, and they do not include the capital of firms
incorporated under Parliamentary Acts such as apply to railways, public
utilities and public welfare companies.
GThe first measure covering the registration, incorporation and regulation of joint stock companies was placed on the statute books in September
1844. This Act differs widely from the 1929 measure but it is interesting to
note that it embodied the principle of investors" protection by means of
publicity. It required directors to prepare a "full and fair balance sheet"
and to appoint auditors for an annual inspection of the firm's accounts. A
balance sheet and auditors' report were required to be sent to every shareholder at least ten days before an ordinary meeting, and these documents
had to be filed with the Registrar of joint stock companies.
7See testimony of representatives of the Economist, Minutes of Evidence 16, April 18, 1944.
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auditors' duties enlarged to cover that document as well as the
consolidated accounts of holding companies.
Close examination of English Company Law reveals that although many restrictions are imposed upon the limited company,
especially as to account maintenance, the requirements are not
onerous. Before the passage of the 1929 Act no legislative measure
prescribed the form and content of the balance sheet or required
that a profit and loss account be submitted for a company in general
meeting. Under this Act, also, English companies were required
for the first time to keep proper books of account with respect to
"all sums of money received and expended, and the matters in
respect of which the receipt and expenditure take place; all sales
and purchases of goods by the company; and the assets and liabilities of the company." The Law is silent, however, as to the requisite
professional qualifications of auditors depending, instead, upon the
profession's standards to protect the public interest. Again, Company Law states no requirements as to the profit and loss account,
and its provisions for the balance sheet are generally held to be
inadequate. Individual proprietorships and partnerships do not
need to present accounts covering their financial positions and operations. Public utilities, banking and insurance companies, and deposit, provident and benefit societies must present their accounts
in statutory form but assurance companies, covered by the 1909
Companies Act, are excluded from the 1929 measure. The more
important statutory enactments covering the form and content of
financial statements and the activities of the auditor follow:
Industrial and Provident Societies Acts 1893-1928
Friendly Societies Acts 1896-1929
Industrial Assurance Acts 1923-1929
(Under the above Acts auditors are appointed by Lord Commissioners of H. M. Treasury)
Companies Clauses Consolidation Act 1845
Railway Companies Act 1867
Regulation of Railways Act 1860
Railway Companies Act 1911
Railways Act 1921
Gas Works Clauses Acts 1847 and 1871
Gas Regulation Act 1920
Waterworks Clauses Acts 1847
Electric Lighting Acts 1882-1909
Electricity Supply Acts 1916 and 1926
Assurance Companies Act 1909
Building Societies Acts 1874 and 1894
Trustee Savings Bank Act 1893
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Public Trustee Act 1906
Judicial Trustee Act 1896
Trustee Act 1925
Licensing Act 1910
Municipal Corporation Acts 1882 and 1933
Public Health Act 1875
Local Government Acts 1888, 1894, 1899 and 1933
An investigatory committee in 1927 held against drastic amendment of the prevailing Company Law under the premise that shareholders should be permitted to formulate the accounting requirements of their firms. Its report stated that "it is often forgotten
that it may be in the best interests of shareholders for accounts
to be prepared in a certain form and we consider that undue interference by the legislature in the internal affairs of companies is to
be avoided, even if some risk of hardship in individual cases is involved."'" Since the 1929 Act came into force public attention has
been directed to the heavy losses which investors, many of whom
subscribed for their shares on the basis of unsatisfactory prospectuses, suffered in the slump which followed the 1928-29 boom.
Neither this measure nor the Revised Rules of the London Stock
Exchange governing the grant of official quotations and permission
to deal had come into force in time to affect the prospectuses in
question. The issue arose, also, whether the exemption of private
companies from the obligation to file accounts with the Registrar
of Companies should be permitted to continue. The practice of
placing shares in the names of nominees for the real owners was
followed to conceal the core of control, and it led to a widespread
demand that the real ownership should be disclosed.
Current legal requirements as to the contents of accounts to be
presented to shareholders are generally considered to be far too
meagre. The tendency of showing a number of diverse items in
one lump sum, and thereby obscuring the real position of the assets
and liabilities and the results of trading, makes it difficult and often
impossible for a shareholder to form a correct view of the financial
position and earnings of the company in which he is interested.
London Stock Exchange requirements, although they go beyond
the law, are applied with discretion and they do not apply to companies with issues already quoted or, in the case of holding companies, to units below the first degree. In general, the Exchange
requires approximately the same amount of balance sheet and profit
-Report of Company Law Amendment Committee, Wilfred Greene,
Chairman, Cmd. 2657, p. 74.
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and loss data as is required by the Government, and this information is limited and not uniform in type. At the end of each accounting period, listed companies must submit a balance sheet, such as
is circulated to shareholders, and a profit and loss statement which
has been laid by the auditor before the annual meeting. All companies admitted to future listing must file a consolidated balance
sheet and a consolidated profit and loss account.
The London Stock Exchange does not vouch for the soundness
of the issues listed on its boards but it does ascertain that Company
Law is generally followed. On the other hand, the responsibility
of accountants relative to security issues is restricted to the preparation of vital financial information to be submitted to the Exchange
by the issuing company. As propectuses must be prepared for all
public offerings of securities, in accordance -with the prescribed legal
form to be filed at Somerset House and with the Exchange, the
accountant has an important task to complete. To those issues which
are introduced to the public through the "granting of permission
to deal by any recognized Stock Exchange in Great Britain," the
statutory prospectus and registration provisions do not apply and
no prospectus, in fact, need be compiled, distributed or filed.
In such a case the Committee of the Stock Exchange, rather than
a Government agency, assumes responsibility for listing.
None of the very large banks, popularly known as the Big Five,
except in very rare cases, consider themselves as "fathering" issues
in any way or responsible for them beyond seeing "that the prospectus complies generally with the law and that the issues on their
face are respectable." 9 The common practice of Clearing Banks,
however, when considering whether to allow their names to appear
upon a prospectus (or on an Offer for Sale or an advertisement for
Stock Exchange purposes) is for the banks concerned to satisfy
themselves as to the respectability of the directors of companies and
the soundness of the issue; to scrutinize the document to see
whether the requirements of the Companies Act relative to the
prospectus have been complied with; and to examine the document
with the object of being satisfied, as far as possible, that the prospectus is not obviously misleading and that the parties named in it
are capable of fulfilling underwriting contracts. They also estimate whether the promotion profits and expenses shown in the
prospectus appear reasonably proportionate to the amount of the
9

Macmillan Report 1931, paragraph 388.
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issue and ascertain whether the company appears to have sufficient
capital to carry out the program outlined in the prospectus. 10
One problem attacked by the Cohen Committee was the legal
provisions governing the preparation of financial statements. Under
the 1929 Act, it was possible to lump together on a balance sheet
such diversified assets as land, buildings, plant, machinery, ships,
water transports, copyrights, development account and investments.
Stock, stores, debts, work in progress, unfinished contracts, bills
and cash was another possible classification which would meet
the law. On the balance sheet of one well-known company the
profit and loss item shows a total on trading account of nearly
/ 1,000,000 which is stated to include "dividends from subsidiary
and associated companies, loan interest and transfer fees, after deducting interest on debenture stocks and mortgages, directors' fees,
salaries, wages, rents, rates, taxes, war damage premiums, repairs
and other expenses, and after providing depreciation and reserves
for contingencies."
Company directors under the prevailing law can use any of the
following obscure approaches to accounts: first, adoption of technical language which although conveying meaning to accountants and
directors may afford a totally different meaning to investors and
financial experts; second, combination of assets the value of which
is expressed in one or more aggregate figures with no information
as to the composition of the item; third, employment of systems
of valuation which do not agree with statement values under certain
conditions; fourth, omission of the real relation of a company's
profit and loss account to current earnings; fifth, use of secret
reserves; sixth, omission of information regarding subsidiaries;
seventh, failure to report contingent liabilities; eighth, omission
of data occurring betveen date of statements and date of their
presentation to shareholders.
A typical English profit and loss account is stated below and
it affords some knowledge of the unfortunate abbreviated feature
of contemporary statements of this nature:
To directors' remuneration
By profit from trading account
To provision for depreciation
after
penses meeting working exTo interest on debentures
To income tax
By income from investments
To balance being profit for year
'0 See Minutes of Evidence 10, January 2, 1944, for testimony of Committee of London Clearing Banks. By way of contrast, testimony of Committee on General Purposes of the London Stock Exchange, Minutes of
Evidence 12, February 11, 1944, should be examined.
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It is not uncommon for a company to show in the profit and loss
account some such omnibus item as "trading profit, including income from investments after making provision for expenses of
management, depreciation, bad debts, and so forth." In such a case
shareholders have no means of ascertaining the revenue from investments, that is, capital invested in such companies, the expenses
of management, depreciation or bad debts, or the gross profit on
trading.
English auditors have no responsibility for building up the
income figure. A single item may contain operating results, dividends and non-recurring income, and neither the amount nor the
method of calculating depreciation need be given. Dependence
traditionally has been placed upon the ethical standard of company
directors and auditors rather than upon the written law in regard
to profit and loss disclosure. The first legal decision of any consequence as to the responsibility of the English auditor for the profit
and loss account was handed down in the Royal Mail Case. 1' On
the basis of this case, it appears that the profit and loss account
should present a true and correct view of the profits of a business
for the period under examination with unusual items separated from
those of a normal, recurring nature. Other points raised at this
trial included the following: first, the law holds that a statement
is capable of misleading the readers even though it contains no
specific inexactitude of fact; second, a balance sheet which is not
accompanied by a detailed and frank profit and loss account may
be misleading relative to the position of the company and is unlikely to be a sound guide to the current value of its shares; third,
auditors .upon whom shareholders and the public rely for protection
are handicapped partly because their exact responsibility for the
profit and loss account is undefined and partly because their influence upon directors is not based upon defined statute and power
of intervention but upon the personal relationship of two people,
each to the other.
After giving detailed consideration to the deficiencies in Company Law relating to both the balance sheet and the profit and loss
account the Cohen Committee prepared a number of important
recommendations covering these two statements. These included
the following:
1. Section 124 (1) should be amended to provide that the balance
sheet shall provide a true and fair view of the affairs of the Com1

1933.

Brooks, Collin, Royal Mail Case, London, William Hodge and Co.,
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pany. For this purpose it shall classify under headings appropriate to the business of the company the share capital, reserves,
provisions, liabilities and assets of the company, shall distinguish
between the amounts respectively of the fixed and of the current
assets, and shall state how the amounts at which the fixed assets
are stated have been ascertained. Fixed assets should be defined
as assets not held for sale or for reconversion into cash and current assets as cash and assets held for conversion into cash.
Where ascertainable there shall be shown separately the cost of
fixed assets under each heading in existence at balance sheet date,
and the accumulated amount provided or written off for depreciation in respect thereof, the difference being recorded in the
assets column.
2. Investments in subsidiary companies shall continue to be shown
separately as provided by Section 125 of the 1929 Act. Other investments shall be shown separately under the classifications of
trade investment (other than investment in subsidiary companies), other quoted investments and other unquoted investments provided that in the case of the last-named the market
value shall be stated in a footnote if it differs from the balance
sheet amount.
3. There shall also be shown separately the nominal amount of any
debentures of the company held by the company; the amount of
premiums on share capital; the aggregate, if material, of any
capital reserves, defined as any amounts which, whether or not
they were originally set aside as provisions to meet any diminution in value of assets, specific liability, contingency or commitment known to exist at the balance sheet date, are not retained for that purpose and are now regarded as free for distribution to the profit and loss account; the aggregate, if material, of other reserves, defined as any amounts which, having
been set aside out of revenue or other surpluses, are free because
they are not retained to meet any diminution in value of assets,
specific liability, contingency or commitment known to exist at
the balance sheet date; the aggregate, if material, of provisions
which, not being provisions for diminution in value of assets,
have been set aside out of revenues or other surpluses, and are
retained to meet, in cases where the amounts cannot be determined with any substantial accuracy, any specific liability, contingency or commitment known to exist at the balance sheet date.
The Committee states, however, that amounts retained as provisions, whether for the foregoing purposes or for diminution in
value of assets, shall not exceed such amounts as in the opinion
of the directors are reasonably required for the purpose; if the
Board of Trade is satisfied that such disclosure would be prejudicial to the company's interest and is not required in the public
interest, the amounts concerned need not be shown separately
but may be included under other headings if appropriate words
are introduced to indicate that provisions of this character are
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included therein; bank loans and overdrafts whether secured or
not; the net amount of any dividends recommended by the
directors.
4. Where during the period covered by the profit and loss account
any material amount is added to capital reserves, other reserves
or provisions, or where any amount, if material, standing to the
credit of any such reserves or any surplus standing to the credit
of such provisions is used, the amount involved, the source from
which they have been provided or the manner in which they
have been used shall be stated in the balance sheet unless the
same shall appear in the profit and loss account or any statement
annexed thereto.
5. The following matters must be dealt with in a note on the balance
sheet or in a statement or report annexed thereto: a) Where in
the opinion of the directors the current assets do not have a
value realizable in the ordinary course of business of the company of at least the amount at which they appear in the balance
sheet, a statement to that effect must be furnished; b) Where
any material part of a company's assets or liabilities comprises
foreign exchange assets or liabilities, the basis of conversion
from foreign currency into sterling for balance sheet purposes
must be given; c) The general nature, and where practicable,
the amount, if material, of contingent liabilities not provided
for in the balance sheet and particulars of any charge given over
the company's property for the debt of another person and also
the amount thereof; d) The gross amount of arrears of fixed
dividends on any class of stock and the date to which such dividends were last paid; e) Where a company has given options
over its share capital, the number of shares affected, the class of
share, the option price, and the date for exercise thereof must be
given; f) The amount or estimated amount of commitments for
capital expenditure, if material, so far as not provided for in the
balance sheet; g) The basis on which provision for United
Kingdom income tax has been made; h) In the case of a holding
company, the aggregate of any shares in, and of any debentures
of, the holding company held by subsidiary companies must be
stated; i) Corresponding figures from the immediately preceding balance must be provided.
Note: Such banking companies and discount companies as the
Board of Trade may designate shall be exempted from complying
with the requirements outlined in the first four paragraphs
stated above, but the balance sheet of these exempted companies
shall indicate by appropriate words where reserves and provisions are included under other headings. Assurance companies
shall be exempted from the first four paragraphs stated above.
The Amendment Committee added to the Companies Act a provision that the profit and loss account shall provide a true and fair
indication of the earnings of the period covered by the account, dis-
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closing any material respects in which it includes extraneous or nonrecurrent transactions or those of an exceptional nature. It is further
provided that if a material change is made in the basis on which the
account or any item therein is calculated, in comparison with the
previous year, attention must be called to the change and to the effect thereof by means of a note on the account. The profit and loss
account, according to Committee recommendations, should include
the following information:
1. Amount of profit or loss before charging or crediting the items
enumerated, but after crediting or charging, if the company
thinks fit, its revenue from or provisions for losses of subsidiary
companies.
2. Provision for depreciation of fixed assets, provided that if allowance is not being made by means of a depreciation charge, the
method of making such provision or the fact that no such provision has been made, shall be stated.
3. Interest on debentures and other fixed loans.
4. Amount of United Kingdom taxation on profits, subdivided
where practicable into income tax, and national defense contribution or excess profits tax or any other tax which may be assessed
on profits. In any event the basis of provision for U. K. income
tax must be disclosed.
5. Amounts provided for the redemption of share capital and loan
capital.
6. The aggregate, if material, of any amounts set aside to reserves.
7. The aggregate, if material, of any amounts set aside as provisions
as defined in the outline above, provided that in any case where
the Board of Trade is satisfied that disclosure of any such provision would be prejudicial to the company's interests and is not
required in the public interest, the amount concerned need not
be shown separately if appropriate words are introduced to indicate that a provision of this character has been made in arriving at the profit or loss for the period.
8. Income from, less provisions for losses of, subsidiary companies,
except insofar as it is included under 1 above.
9. Income from other trade investments.
10. Income from investments other than trade investments:
11. The aggregate, if material, of amounts withdrawn from reserves.
12. The aggregate, if material, of amounts withdrawn from provisions as defined in these recommendations.
13. Profits or losses of a non-current or exceptional nature, if material in amount.
14. Dividends paid or proposed, disclosing whether such amounts
are stated before or after deduction of income tax.
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The profit and loss account shall also contain or cover by way
of note the following further information:
15. Emoluments of directors, including contributions made on
their behalf to any pension scheme, and the aggregate amount
thereof paid by the company.
16. The aggregate amounts of any compensation paid to directors
or former directors of the company, for loss of office or in
connection with or arising out of their retirement from the
company or from any of the other companies subdivided to
show the amounts paid respectively by the company, by such
other companies, and by any other person.
17. The aggregate amounts of any pensions paid to directors or
former directors of the company subdivided to show the
amounts paid respectively by the company and by any of the
other companies but there need not be included in such amounts
any pensions paid under a pension scheme if the company's
contributions to such scheme would be emoluments of the director or former director.
18. Corresponding figures for the immediately preceding period.
Note: Banking and discount companies shall be exempted from
complying with this section except as. regards the requirements in 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 above, but the profit and
loss account of such companies shall indicate by appropriate
words the manner in which the disclosed profits or losses have
been arrived at; and assurance companies shall be exempted
from complying with 2, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12 and 13 above.
The Committee also recommended that Section 129 of the Companies Act 1929 be amended so as to extend the signature provisions to the profit and loss account and to require this account
to be annexed to the balance sheet. Section 122 would be amended
by altering the opening words to read "every company shall cause
to be kept such books of account as are necessary to exhibit a true
and fair view of the state of the company's affairs and to explain
its transactions." A subsection would be added as follows: "Where
a company carries on business at one or more places outside Great
Britain there shall be kept at the registered office of the company
in Britain or at such other place in Britain as the directors may
decide, such accounts and returns from the business so carried on
as shall disclose with reasonable accuracy the financial position of
such business at intervals not exceeding three months and shall
enable the company to prepare the balance sheet and profit and loss
account required by this Act."
In only one respect disappointment, in some quarters, has been
expressed. The Committee decided that compulsory disclosure
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should commence with net earnings, before depreciation, taxes,
provisions, debenture interest, reserves and dividends, but after
expenses of production, selling and distribution, administration
and management. The suggestion has not been adopted, therefore,
that disclosure should begin with a sales turnover figure. This
decision apparently was reached on the ground that publication
of figures of that nature could not have been made in sufficient
detail to achieve useful ends without adding too much detail to
published accounts. However, the Committee stated that such
figures might be of assistance to individuals responsible for framing
general economic policy- the State-but for shareholders and
creditors, for whom it is the purpose of published accounts to provide data, it was believed essential that the form in which information was conveyed should be one that could be easily understood.
Although many reforms were introduced in England by the
Companies Act 1929, the subject of the accounts of holding companies and their subsidiaries was not satisfactorily settled. Under
contemporary legal regulations, holding companies are not required to publish a consolidated balance sheet or separate statements
for their subsidiaries.1 2 Although the law requires that an auditor
must specify how the total profits or losses of subsidiaries have been
dealt with in the accounts of holding companies and whether the
losses have been provided for by either the holding or the subsidiary company, there is no requirement that the amount of the
profits or the losses be disclosed. When an item in a balance sheet
is titled "Investments in Subsidiary Companies" there is no indication as to the assets of those companies and the reader has no
knowledge as to whether they are current or fixed.
The Cohen Committee prepared elaborate recommendations
for consolidated accounts and these are summarized below:
1. A company shall, whether it is a company within the meaning
of the Companies Act or not, be deemed to be a subsidiary company of another company (a holding company) if it is either:
a. A company in respect of which the holding company possesses
-Where a company holds shares in a subsidiary company there must
be annexed to the balance sheet of the holding company a statement stating
how the profits and losses of the subsidiary, or, where there are two or
more subsidiary companies, the aggregate profits and losses of those companies, have, so far as they concern the holding company, been dealt with in,
or for the purposes of, the accounts of the holding company, and in particular how, and to what extent, provision has been made for the losses of
the subsidiary company either in the accounts of that company or of the
holding company, or of both; and how losses of a subsidiary company
have been taken into account by the directors of the holding company as disclosed in its accounts.
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power to appoint or remove or procure the appointment or
removal of a majority of the directors either directly through
the beneficial ownership of the whole or any part of its share
capital or indirectly through the beneficial ownership of the
whole or any part of the share capital by any other company
or companies or through a combination of these means including power liable to suspension in the event of default in
the payment of dividends to persons other than the holding
company and its subsidiary companies, but not including
power arising by virtue only of the provisions of a debenture
trust deed or by virtue of shares issued for the purpose in pursuance of those provisions; or
b. A company in respect of which the holding company possesses
power to appoint or remove or procure the appointment or
removal of a majority of the directors of another company by
some other means than as stated in a. above and is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of any part of the share capital
of such other company; or
c. A company in which more than one-half of the equity share
capital is owned beneficially by the holding company and its
subsidiary companies.
2. A holding company shall annex to its annual accounts a consolidated balance sheet and a consolidated profit and loss account
which shall be drawn up as far as practicable in a manner similar
to that prescribed in the provisions of the new Act relating to the
accounts of companies. The consolidated balance sheet shall combine the information contained in the balance sheet of the h6lding
company with the information contained in the balance sheets of
the subsidiary companies after eliminating inter-company shareholdings and indebtedness and shall allow the aggregate interest, if any, in the share capital and reserves (including profit and
loss account balances) of subsidiary companies of shareholders
other than companies the accounts of which are consolidated.
The consolidated profit and loss account shall combine the information contained in the profit and loss account of the holding
company with the information contained in the profit and loss
accounts of the subsidiary companies after eliminating intercompany transactions and dividends and shall show the extent
of the profit and loss, if any, attributable to shareholders in subsidiary companies (other than companies the accounts of which
are consolidated) and the balance of the consolidated profit or
loss, attributable to the interests of the holding company.
The balance sheets of subsidiary companies shall as far as practicable be made up as at the date of the balance sheet of the holding company. If the directors consider that in order to present a
true and fair view of the state of affairs and of the profit or loss
of the company and its subsidiary companies, the consolidated accounts require adjustment, they should make such adjustments
as appear to them to be appropriate. If the directors are of the
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opinion that it is impracticable or misleading to include in the
consolidated accounts the relative information contained in the
accounts of any subsidiary company, they shall exclude such information.
Note: The Board of Trade shall have power to exempt any banking or discount company or an assurance company from consolidating with its accounts the accounts of any subsidiary company which carries on a business different from that of the
holding company, if and so long as, in the opinion of the Board,
the relationship of subsidiary company and holding company is
temporary only.
3. The directors shall annex to the consolidated balance sheet a
statement giving the reasons why they consider it is not practicable in the case of any subsidiary company whose balance
sheet is not made up as at the date at which the balance sheet of
the holding is prepared, for the balance sheet of such subsidiary
to be made up as at that date; giving the reasons why in their
opinion it is impracticable or would be misleading to include in
consolidated accounts the relative information contained in the
accounts of any subsidiary company; showing in respect of subsidiary companies whose accounts are not included in consolidated accounts, the net aggregate amount attributable to the
interests of the holding company so far as not dealt with either
in the consolidated accounts or in the accounts of a holding company which does not annex consolidated accounts to its annual
accounts:
a. Of the profit or loss, for the period covered by the profit and
loss accounts of such subsidiary companies made up to dates
within the period covered by the profit and loss account of the
holding company, and,
b. So far as practicable, of the aggregate profit, or net income,
including reserves, other than capital reserves, or loss, since
acquisition of such interests by the holding company and its
subsidiary companies;
and giving particulars of any qualifications in the auditors' reports upon the accounts of subsidiary companies where such accounts are not included in consolidated accounts.
4. The consolidated balance sheet shall show the information regarding subsidiary companies whose accounts are excluded from
consolidation, which is required under the Act to be included in
the balance sheet of every company, and the consolidated profit
and loss account shall show the income from, or provisions made
for losses of, subsidiary companies whose accounts are excluded
from consolidation, in respect of the period covered by their profit
and loss accounts made up to a date within the period by the
profit and loss account of the holding company.
5. The Board of Trade may, on the application or with the consent
of a company, alter the requirements stated in 1. above, for the
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purpose of adapting them to the circumstances of that company.
6. In the case of a holding company the auditors shall examine the
consolidated balance sheet and the consolidated profit and loss
account, and any statements required to be annexed to them,
and shall make a report on them to the members of the holding
company, and the report shall state whether, in the opinion of the
auditors, the consolidated financial statements are properly drawn
up in accordance with the provisions of the new Act from the
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of the holding company and of the subsidiary company, the accounts of which have
been consolidated, after giving effect to any adjustments made
by the directors; the adjustments, if any, made by the directors
are appropriate, or any other adjustments are required, according
to the best of their information and the explanations given to
them by the directors of the holding company; the reasons given
by the directors in a statement annexed to the consolidated balance sheet relative to the impracticability of preparing consolidated accounts; the particulars given in respect of the profits
and losses and the qualifications in the auditors' reports upon
the accounts of subsidiary companies excluded from consolidation, have been properly compiled from the information contained in such accounts and the auditors' reports thereon.
7. A subsidiary company shall disclose in its balance sheet the
total amount which it owes to the holding company and to companies which are subsidiaries of such holding company, and the
total amount which is owing to it from such companies.
It is apparent from the above provisions that the Committee
attaches to consolidated accounts the same obligations as have in
the past applied to the statutory accounts of all companies. In fact,
they are considered part of the annual accounts and are to be signed
by the directors who signed the accounts of the holding company.
Auditors will be required to report on the consolidated accounts
and on any statements annexed to 'them. These recommendations
are in line with the Committee's general policy of providing directors with freedom of action but to align them, and the auditors,
with definite statements given over their signatures. The publication of consolidated accounts in England would be a substantial step
in the direction of fullest disclosure of financial information. It
would seem, however, that the Committee, in addition to stating
that directors must explain why they consider consolidation would
be misleading, should also insist that they establish their case.
The Amendment Committee did not make any recommendations on the accounting questions involved in consolidation although
it decided to adopt the presentation of a single consolidated account
as the solution of the problem of condensation. It has foreseen,
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however, that, where a single holding company controls subsidiaries
operating in a number of distinct industries, or carrying on completely different functions, questions will arise in which consolidation by groups ought to be insisted upon as a substitute for, or in
addition to, the entire consolidation. If the foregoing Committee
recommendations are adopted there will gradually emerge detailed
information as to the activities of industrial groups in such detail
as to aid those investors, and investment counselors, who desire to
pursue a policy of long term investment.
Under the Companies Act 1929 the auditor was required to
furnish for the prospectus a report with respect to the profits of
each of the three financial years preceding its issue, the rates of
dividend paid on each class of shares in each of those years, and the
classes of shares on which they had or had not been paid. In addition, the accountants who were named in the prospectus had to report upon the profits for each of the three preceding financial years
of any business which was to be purchased out of the proceeds of
the issue. The Companies Act did not specify the form and content
of the report which the accountant must prepare; it invariably concisely stated the profits earned and provided basic information for
the potential investor. The auditors' responsibility for this data was
restricted to individuals who were the original allottees of shares
and who were induced to buy because of the prospectus. He has no
legal liability for negligence relative to this prospectus under prevailing Company Law.
The Cohen Committee recommendations relative to prospectuses
include the following:
1. There shall be delivered to the Registrar of Companies for
registration with every prospectus a copy of all material contracts mentioned in the prospectus, a statement signed by the
auditors showing any adjustment made by them and the written
consent of any expert to the inclusion in the prospectus of any
extract from his report.
2. A report must be prepared by the company's auditors with respect to the profits or losses of the company for each of the five
financial years immediately preceding the issue of the prospectus
or for each of the years since the incorporation of the company,
if this occurred less than five years prior to such issue, and, if
no accounts have been prepared for any part of such period ending on a date three months before the issue of the prospectus,
containing a statement of that fact. In making such report, the
auditors shall prepare such adjustments as are in their opinion
necessary for purposes of the prospectus. In the case of an issue
by a holding company, a similar report with respect to the profits
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and losses of the company and of its subsidiaries, so far as such
profits and losses are attributable to the interests of the holding
company. With respect to the rates of the dividends, if any, paid
by the company for each class of shares in the company for five
years, giving particulars of the shares on which dividends have
been and have not been paid. Relative to the assets and liabilities
of the'company, a report with respect to these items of the company and of its subsidiaries, with auditors preparing any necessary adjustments.
3. If the proceeds of the issue of the shares or debentures are to be
applied directly or indirectly in the purchase of a business or of
shares in a company which is or will become a subsidiary, a report shall be made by the accountants named in the prospectus
relative to the profits or losses of the business for five financial
years immediately preceding this prospectus, with the accountants making any necessary adjustments.
4. Any expert named in the prospectus, such as bankers, brokers,
solicitors, and accountants, shall be liable to pay compensation
for untrue or misleading statements included in the prospectus.
5. It shall be illegal to include any copy or summary of, or extract
from, experts' reports on property acquired -without the written
approval of the experts.
6. Experts will be civilly liable relative to any forged statement to
any persons subscribing for shares on the faith of a prospectus
containing their statement unless they can show that they had
reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be true up to
the time of allotment of the shares. It is also recommended that
a director who has signed the prospectus containing a false statement shall be liable both civilly and criminally unless he can
prove that he did not know the statement was false and could
not by taking reasonable precautions have ascertained its falsity.
If this recommendation is carried into law it will represent a
serious encroachment on the principle of English law that a man
'is innocent until he is proved to be guilty.
7. A minimum compulsory interval of two days shall occur between
the publication of the prospectus and the opening of the lists to
enable intending investors to obtain expert advice and to permit
the publication of newspaper comment. The company is required to apply to the Stock Exchange within two days after
issue of the prospectus for permission to deal and, if this is refused, to cancel allotments and return subscriptions.
The Cohen Committee devoted considerable section of its report to improvements in the prospectus and the general handling
of issues. In dealing with the subject of prospectus information it
supports the London Stock Exchange in exacting requirements
beyond those legally enforceable and expresses. the view that "if any
reform of the law of libel were possible which encouraged freedom
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of comment without opening the way to unjustified defamation, it
would undoubtedly afford an additional weapon against the type
of promoter who is averse to disclosure of all material facts."'13
But it urges the Stock Exchange to continue its good work and the
public to secure amendment of the libel law. The Committee has
attempted to place the investor in the position of a shareholder who
has received accounts over a period of years, and in those cases
where such detail is not available a close approximation must be
provided.
Auditors have never been considered responsible for English
company accounts, as this duty accrues to directors. 14 It is the
former's task to take the balance sheet prepared by the directors
and to audit this document, commenting upon it in their report.-The
exact nature of the auditors' work is left to their judgment, based
upon the theory that they are deemed to be skilled in their profession. A review of cases tried in English courts, covering the duties
and responsibilities of auditors, leads to the following conclusibns:
1. An accountant must honestly satisfy himself that the accounts
show a true and correct view of the financial position of the
concern.
2. He must examine the books and satisfy himself that they are
correct.
3. It is not part of his duty to take stock.
4. The auditor is entitled to rely upon the opinion of experts where
special knowledge is required.
5. He need not necessarily be suspicious.
6. It is not part of his duty to give advice.
7. If he is not satisfied upon any material point he must report
clearly to shareholders or partners.
8. He must verify the existence of assets so far as is reasonably
possible.
9. In case of a company he must see that the memorandum and
the articles are carried out.
10. If he is negligent he may be liable in damages.
11. What is reasonable care depends on the circumstances but the
general standard of the profession must be considered, also.
13A Departmental Committee is investigating the law of defamation in

England and the desirability of mitigating by legislation the rigor of the
common law liability for libel on the part of publishers of newspapers.
See Langlands
v. Leng (1916) S. C. (H. L.) at p. 110.
24For substantiation of this view see decision of Mr. Justice Bennett
in re Catterson and Son, Ltd., reported in the Accountant of February 27,
1937, pp. 308-311.
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12. In a private firm the auditor must have the scope of the audit
in writing..
13. The auditor is not liable for tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes of fraud.
14. If he wilfully certifies accounts knowing them to be false he is
criminally liable.
15. The auditor incurs a risk by not disclosing secret reserves.
16. The auditor is responsible for the profit and loss account and
must see that it does give a fair view of the earnings of the
period and that profit and loss accounts are prepared on the
same basis each year.
Legal cases, as a whole, hold the auditor responsible for the
expert performance of his ,duty, and judges or juries assess damages if he fails to exercise the skill of an ordinarily skillful practitioner. Lord Justice Lindlay handing down the opinion in re London and General Bank (No. 2) 1895 outlined the duty of the auditor
by stating: "He must be honest, that is he must not certify what he
does not believe to be true, and he must take reasonable care and
skill before he believes that what he certifies is true. What is reasonable care in any particular case must depend upon the circumstances
of that case." And Lord justice Lopes in re Kingston Cotton Mills
Co., Ltd. (No. 2) 1896, 1 Ch. 231, drew attention to the fact that
the auditors' duties should not be too onerous as the work is great
and the salary small. The decision of Mr. Justice Sterlin in re
Leeds Estate Building and Investment Co. v. Shepherd 1887, 36
Ch. D. 787, enlarged the duties of auditors beyond the mathematical
accuracy of the balance sheet.
The main differences between the audit of a firm and a limited
company from the English point of view are stated below:
Firm
1. Governed by specific instructions from clients and partnership articles (if any). Partnership Act 1890 and/or Limited
Partnership Act 1907 must be
consulted for rights of partners
if no agreement is in existence.

Limited Company
1. Governed by statute, i.e.,
Companies Act 1929, special act
or charter, and effect of legal decisions.

2. Extent of work may be varied, enlarged or restricted by
partners.

2. Rights and duties of auditors
cannot be restricted by articles
but may be enlarged. Auditor
must conform to Sec. 134 of
Companies Act 1929.
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Firm
3. Written partnership agreement may not be available or
shown to auditor.

Limited Company
3. Auditor must know the contents of articles of company
(Leeds v. Shepherd 1887) and
ascertain what duties are cast
upon him. He may be liable to
damages suffered as a result of
his non-detection of ultra vires
acts. (In re Republic of Bolivia
1913.)

4. Auditor reports or certifies in
accordance with terms of his appointment.

4. Auditor reports to members
in terms of Sec. 134 or under
Sec. 113 certifies the statutory
report as correct (as far as it
relates to shares allotted, cash
used in respect of such shares,
and receipts and payments on
capital account).

5. May be sole trader, or general
or limited partnership.

5. Company may be public or
private; auditor should see that
restrictions are not transgressed,
e.g., number of members in case
of private company.

6. Treatment of profit and/or
losses depends upon specific instructions.

6. Auditor must see that accounts distinguish between losses
of fixed or floating capital; profit
and dividends; and classes of
capital profits, e.g., where company has adopted the double account system.

7. Auditor may be liable at common law for negligence, etc., but
may contract himself out of liability.

7. Auditor liable to common law
liability. He may be held liable
under Sec. 276 for misfeasance
where he is held to be an officer
of the company. Exoneration
from liability contained in articles is of no effect.

The Cohen Committee's recommendations for the revision of
Company Law relative to auditors are as follows:
1. If no auditor is appointed or deemed to be appointed at an annual
general meeting, the company shall inform the Board of Trade
who shall appoint an auditor for the company for the current
year.
2. A retiring auditor, if willing to act and eligible for appointment
under Sec. 133 of the 1929 Act, shall be deemed to be reappointed
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unless some other person is duly appointed in his place or a
resolution that he shall not be reappointed is duly passed and notice of intention to propose such resolution has been given by a
member to the company not less than 28 days before the annual
general meeting. If such notice is given, the company shall forthwith send a copy of any such notice to the retiring auditor who
shall have the right to send a written statement of his views to
the shareholders at the reasonable expense of the company.
3. The remuneration of the auditors of a company shall be fixed
either by the company in general meeting or in such manner as
may be prescribed by the company in general meeting except
that the remuneration of an auditor appointed before the first
annual general meeting, or of an auditor appointed to fill a casual
vacancy, may be fixed by the directors, and that the remuneration
of an auditor appointed by the Board of Trade may be fixed by
the Board. Provided that where the remuneration is not fixed
by the company in general meeting, the amount thereof shall be
stated as a separate item in the profit and loss account of the
accounting period to which the audit relates.
4. None of the following persons shall be eligible for appointment
as auditor of a company:
a. A person -who is not a member of any body membership of
which has been designated .by the Board of Trade as qualifying its members to audit the accounts of companies or who
has not been designated by the Board of Trade as qualified to
audit the accounts of companies;
b. A director or other officer or employee of the company or of
any of its subsidiary companies or of a company which is a
holding company in relation to the first-named company, or
of any of the subsidiary companies of such holding company;
c. A person who is a partner of or in the employment of a director or other officer of employee of the company or of any
of the companies referred to in sub-paragraph b;
d. A body corporate.
For the purpose of this subsection an auditor shall not be deemed
to be an officer of the company.
5. The auditors shall make a report to the members on the accounts
examined by them, and on every balance sheet and profit and loss
account laid before the company in general meeting during their
tenure of office, and the report shall state:
a. Whether in their opinion proper books of account have been
kept or, in the case of a company with branches whose books
have not been examined by the auditors, whether proper
books of account have been kept at the principal office and
branches visited by the auditors and proper accounts and returns adequate for purposes of their audit have been received from other branches;
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b. Whether or not they have obtained all the information and explanations which to the best of their knowledge and belief
were necessary for the purposes of their audit;
c. Whether the balance sheet and profit and loss account referred
to in the report are in agreement with the books, accounts and
returns, and whether in their opinion and to the best of their
information and according to the explanations given to them
the accounts are properly drawn up in accordance with the
provisions of the new Act and exhibit a true and fair view of
(1) the state of affairs of the company as at the date of the
balance sheet and (2) the profit and loss for the period ended
on that date; and
d. In the case of a holding company which does not annex consolidated accounts to its annual accounts whether in their opinion the reasons given by the directors for not presenting consolidated accounts are satisfactory and whether the particulars given in respect of the profits or losses and the qualifications in the auditors' reports upon the accounts of subsidiary
companies have been properly compiled from the information
contained in such accounts and the auditors' reports thereon.
6. Every auditor of a company shall have a right of access at all
times to the books, returns, accounts, and vouchers of the company, and shall be entitled to require from the directors and officers of the company such information and explanations as are
in his opinion necessary for the performance of his duties.
7. The auditors of a company shall be entitled to receive notice of
and attend any general meeting of the company and to make any
statement or explanation they desire at such meeting.
The Cohen Report's recommendations as to auditors and their
duties emanate from within the profession itself. They are based
on the assumption that the auditor's duties involve his responsibility
to the client and to the Revenue authorities, and a recognition that
the interests of the community are involved, to a greater or lesser
degree, in every business which operates under the protection of
Company Law. As to qualifications which should be possessed by
the auditor in the future, it may happen that the proposals for coordination of all practitioners, now under consideration by the accounting profession, may afford a better method of determining
who may be considered qualified to serve. It is interesting to note,
however, that "for reasons of reciprocity some provision must be
made to allow accountants with adequate qualifications obtained
abroad to act as auditors." The problem of reciprocity between
accounting societies in various parts of the world has increased in
importance during the last few years. Perhaps it is not too much
to hope that the discussions on this point arising on this Report
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may lead all accountants to accept the desirability of ultimately
creating a coordinated standard of accountancy in all parts of the
globe.
A considerable section of the Amendment Committee's Report
is devoted to enhancing shareholders' control over their companies.
Some of the increased duties and penalties imposed upon directors
have already been mentioned in the preceding discussion of reports
and prospectuses although no mention has been made of directors'
remuneration. The Greene Committee in 1926 refused to disclose
more than directors' joint fees, although at that time there was
widespread demand for total emoluments of each individual. The
best contemporary opinion in England is that directors should be
permitted to fight out their individual problems among themselves,
that what really concerns the public is the total cost of the higher
direction of a business. Some witnesses before the Cohen Committee who considered the problem from this viewpoint also wanted
the main items of production costs and the total remuneration of
the higher executives reported. The Committee, however, rejected
this view in favor of one that all such questions were matters
which should be left to the discretion of the directors but that, since
the directors fixed their own total remuneration, this item ought
to be disclosed. They have, therefore, suggested not only a total
figure but the splitting up of the sum into fees and salaries, expenses
not admitted as such for tax purposes, contributions to pension
schemes for directors, payments of pension to directors otherwise
than from the pension scheme, and payments by the company for
loss of office as a director or in any other capacity. There is also
an additional obligation placed upon the individual director to disclose any payment received from outside interests in connection
with the loss of his office, as in the case of the merger of the company with another firm.
Relative to actions of a director which may be influenced by
special inside knowledge of the business, the law compels him, if
he is interested in a contract with his company, to disclose the fact
to his fellow directors. The Cohen Committee, however,.considers
directors should disclose any such contracts as are of material importance to shareholders if any member of the board has a substantial interest in them. As to dealings by directors in the shares
of -companies in which they are interested, the Committee held that
inside information is seldom improperly used by the directors themselves, but that the equally undesirable practice of supplying friends
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with information is more usual. Actual dealings of directors, in its
opinion, should be recorded and available for inspection by the
Board of Trade, although the record is only to be made available to
shareholders for two weeks before the annual general meeting. Apparently it is not to be made public.
There are a number of additional recommendations as to directors. These include facilitation of the removal of a director, a
plan for attempting to enforce retirement of aged directors, and
a total ban on companies, other than lending firms, making loans in
any form to directors. 15
The 1929 Companies Act contains no provisions for proxies
and their validity under English law depends on the articles of
association of the particular company. Directors of a company customarily invite shareholders to sign proxies in their favor but the
London Stock Exchange has stipulated that companies should outline their proxies so that the shareholder may vote for or against
the proposal unless it is business of a routine nature. The Amendment Committee has permitted the Exchange to continue to supply
regulations but it does recommend that a shareholder should have
an unqualified right to appoint as his proxy anyone he wishes,
whether or not he is a shareholder, and that such proxy should have
the right to speak and vote.
One of the most interesting proposals of the Committee is the
suggested abolition of the doctrine of ultra vires. A contract made
by the directors on a subject not within the scope of the company's
objectives, as set forth in its Memorandum of Association, is under
English law today ultra vires the company and beyond the powers
of the directors. The Committee considers that the doctrine no
longer serves a useful purpose, and proposes its abolition.
The Committee considered whether the 1929 Act should be
amended to enable shares of no par value to be issued. As there is
little demand for and much opposition to any such proposal, its
members have offered no change in procedures. After detailed study
of the exemption conferred on private companies from having to
file accounts, the Committee believes this exemption to be justified.
It recommends that the accounts of any subsidiary which is a private
company should be dealt with in the consolidated accounts published
by the holding company in the same manner as any subsidiary
public company. It further recommends that, in general, private
15For detailed recommendations covering directors see Cohen Committee Peport, pp. 50-53 and pp. 84-87.
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companies should be required in the future to file accounts and
circulate them to their shareholders. It has, however, relieved from
this obligation small family businesses incorporated as companies.
There is a widespread feeling in England at the present time
that the ease with which directors and other individuals hide their
interest in securities is greatly aided by the use of nominee holdings.
The Committee is in agreement as to the desirability of disclosure
of those persons who are the beneficial owners of holdings, if it
can be achieved without a volume of work completely out of line
to the benefits involved. It recommends, first, that all transfers
should contain a declaration whether the transferee is the beneficial
owner (existing owners are to be asked to make a corresponding
declaration), but no obligation is placed upon the nominee to disclose the beneficial owner, because it is felt this would involve too
much work. Second, beneficial owners of one per cent or more of
any class of capital of a company are required to make a declaration
of ownership of any shares held in the name of nominees. Any
person who fails to make this declaration, or offers a false statement, or votes in respect of holdings for which a declaration should
be made, is to be liable to maximum penalties of six months' imprisonment and a fine of C500. A third recommendation of the
Committee is that where very definite information is thought desirable, the Board of Trade shall be empowered to make a full investigation. It appears, on the face of past facts, that the Board
would not undertake investigations without a large amount of evidence. If what is required, as many believe, is some method by
which voting power is withheld from those who have not established
their beneficial ownership, no suggestion so far offered affords
any real solution.
The specific proposals of the Amendment Committee covering
nominee shareholdings may be stated as follows:
1. Every transfer of shares shall contain a declaration by the
transferee stating whether or not he will be the beneficial owner
of the shares comprised therein.
2. Every company shall on the day of issuing the notice convening
the first annual general meeting of the company to be held
more thaii one month after the coming into force of the new
Act, send to every registered holder of shares, who has not
signed a declaration as transferee under 1. above, a notice requiring him within two months after receiving such notice to
sign and deliver to the company a declaration whether or not
he is the beneficial owner of the shares registered in his name.
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3. If any person who has signed a declaration of beneficial ownership ceases to be beneficial owner of any share comprised in
such declaration, while remaining the registered holder, he shall
be bound forthwith to send to the company a declaration of
cesser of such'ownership.
4. If any person who has signed a declaration that he holds the
shares registered in his name as a nominee, ceases so to hold
any of them, while remaining the registered holder, he shall
be bound forthwith to send to the company a declaration to
that effect.
5. Every company shall on the day of issuing the notice convening
the annual general meeting of the company (other than the
first annual general meeting after the coming into force of the
new Act) send to every registered holder of shares, a notice
drawing attention to the requirements set out under the detailed recommendations.
6. Where any person is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner
of one per cent or more of the issued capital of the company or
of the issued shares of any class and where any of such shares
are not registered in his name, he shall send to the company
within two months of the date of the coming into force of the
Act or within 10 days of the date on which he becomes such
owner, whichever is the later date, a declaration stating the
number and class of shares of the company of which he is such
owner and the names of the registered holders of the shares and
if any charge occurs in the matters covered by such declaration, he shall send to the company within 10 days of the day on
which the change occurs, a declaration stating the change:
Provided that the Board of Trade may grant exemption from
this provision where it seems to it expedient in the national
interest to do so.
7. A person shall for the purpose of this section be deemed to be
the beneficial owner of a share if he is absolutely entitled to the
share; or entitled absolutely or conditionally to require the
transfer of the share to himself or to any person nominated by
him; or entitled directly or indirectly to control the exercise
of the voting right in respect of the share.
8. Every company shall on the day of issuing the notice convening
the first annual general meeting of the company to be held more
than one month after the coming into force of the new Act, and
on the day of issuing the notice convening subsequent annual
general meetings of the company send, to every registered
holder of shares, a notice drawing attention to the requirements outlined in this Report.
9. Any person failing to make any declaration requiring to be
made under the above provisions; or making a declaration
under the above provisions which is false in any material par-
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10.

11.

12.

13.

ticular; or voting in respect of any share as to which any declaration requiring to be made under points 1, 3 or 4 has not been
made or has falsely been made; or instructing or allowing any
person to vote or voting in respect of any share in respect of
which he is under an obligation to make a7 declaration under
paragraph 6 but has failed to do so or has made a false declaration shall be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding
£500 or both.
If default is made in sending any notice required to be sent
pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 or 8 above, the company and every
director or manager or secretary who is knowingly a party to
the default, shall be liable to a default fine.
Every company shall keep its register of members, and compile
the list of members required under Sec. 108 (1) each in twoparts, one part relating to members who have signed declarations that they are the beneficial owners of the shares registered
in their names, and the other part relating to members who
have signed declarations that they are not beneficial owners of
the shares registered in their names.
Every company shall keep in one or more books a record of
the names and addresses of the persons who have signed declarations under paragraph 6, the number and class of shares of
which they have notified the company that they are directly or
indirectly the beneficial owners, the names of the registered
holders of the shares and any changes notified to the company
in the matters 'covered by such declaration. Provisions as to
inspection and the right to copies shall apply similar to those
specified in Sec. 98 (1) and (2). Every company shall file
with the annual return required under Sec. 108, particulars
showing the names and addresses of the persons who have
signed declarations under paragraph 6 and that number and
class of shares of which they have notified the company that
they are directly or indirectly the beneficial owners, and the
names of the registered holders of the shares, as at the date
of the annual return.
Notwithstanding anything in the paragraphs above, the company shall, for all purposes of company administration, be
entitled to treat the registered owner as the legal owner of the
shares registered in his name.
If the Board of Trade considers it necessary in the public
interest to investigate the ownership of shares in any company,
it may appoint an inspector to conduct such investigation. The
inspector should report to the Board who should forward a
copy of his report to the company and should be at liberty to
publish such report or file a copy thereof with the Registrar
of Companies.
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14. When the Board of Trade has appointed an inspector to conduct an investigation as regards any company under paragraph
13, the Board may at any time and from time to time direct
that company not to pay dividends on, or to permit the exercise
of any rights (including the right of transfer) attached to all
or any of the shares in the company specified in such direction
and may revoke, vary or suspend any such direction.
It will be noted that the Committee did not require the disclosure in the case of nominee holdings of the name of the beneficial
owners. This is to save the additional work which would thereby
fall on registrars of companies without necessarily compelling the
disclosure of the identity of the real owners. The objective will be
achieved if another recommendation is adopted which proposes
that every person who directly or indirectly owns one percent or
more of the capital or on any class of shares in a company will be
required to file a declaration of such ownership and details of such
declarations will be available for public inspection. These proposals will prove difficult to enforce and the Committee emphasizes
their deterrent effect as the real recommendation for their adoption.
In order to deal with those cases where a knowledge of the true
ownership is necessary in the public interest, the Board of Trade
is to be provided with drastic powers of inquiry and inspection.
The Company Law Amendment Report, when viewed in its
entirety, is seen to stress that the future system of British private
enterprise must operate with complete honesty and with full
publicity. When considering all aspects of business and accounting
practice, including company managements, the Committee has attacked each subject with equal intensity except, perhaps, that of
the increasing use of nominees for shareholdings. So widespread,
in fact, has this procedure become that in 1943 over 600,000 individual holdings of stocks and shares were registered in the name
of nominees of the joint stock banks alone. Drastic action is called
for either by the prohibition altogether of the nominee plan (except
for attorneys and trustees) or nominees should be compelled
by law to disclose to the companies the names of their beneficial
owners. The Cohen Coimmittee rejected these alternatives, recommending that shareholders be required to state, on signing a transfer
or direction to the company, whether they are beneficial owners or
not; that if any person is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner
of one percent or more of the issued capital he must make a full
declaration to the company and disclose his holdings. In addition,
the Board of Trade would be provided with drastic powers to in-
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vestigate the ownership of shares whenever it is considered desirable in the public interest. These recommendations will not mean
the end of the growth of the nominee scheme and they will provide company secretaries with a great deal of extra work because
of the necessity of maintaining a separate register for nominees.
In relation to other matters the Cohen Committee's proposals
are drastic, especially as to the secretiveness of company accounts
and the responsibility of directors. It was not generally known, before the Committee inquiry, that the proportion of private to public
companies has been steadily increasing in recent years. Between
1934 and 1944, for instance, the number of private companies rose
from 115,603 to 169,205, with a capitalization of C1,935,000,000
at the latter year, while the number of public companies fell from
14,852 to 13,303 with capitalization for these firms standing at
C4,052,000,000. The great advantage of the private company, the
fact that it need not file its accounts with the Registrar of Companies, has led many public companies to convert their subsidiaries
into private companies. The Amendment Committee has suggested
that no private company can claim exemption from filing accounts
if its membership includes a body corporate (other than a corporation sole), or if a body corporate is beneficially interested in its
shares. Although this recommendation permits the private family
company to go unhampered, it stops abuses on the part of public
firms. In addition, holding companies are to disclose full information about their subsidiaries by publishing consolidated accounts.
On the presentation of accounts generally the Committee follows
the suggestions of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, coming
out strongly against hidden reserves.
One major weakness of the Companies Act 1929 was that directors were only liable for untrue statements in a prospectus. The
Amendment Committee recommends that they should be liable at
civil law also for misleading statements and for the omission of
material information which may be misleading. It will also make
the expert liable for any untrue or misleading report which he
formally allows the directors to include in a prospectus. Advertisements for "placings" are to be put on the same footing as prospectuses.
As to directors, the Committee has decided to compel full disclosure of directors' interests at board meetings and in the prospectus, requiring a register to be maintained of their transactions
in their companies' shares or stocks which must be open for inspec-
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tion fourteen days before the annual general meeting. This change
will not prevent an unscrupulous director from taking advantage
of inside information to make a profit on the Stock Exchange for
be will be able to inform a friend and ask him to do the buying
and selling for his account.
The Cohen Committee has made a decided effort to strengthen
the bands of shareholders against directors. It suggests that twentyone day's notice be given of the annual meeting instead of seven;
that directors must come up for reelection singly, and that any
director can be removed from office by an ordinary resolution;
that if shareholders holding not less than 5% of the votes (or 100
shareholders holding not less than C11 each) give due notice of
an intended resolution, the directors will be forced to circulate it
with the annual report; and that shareholders be permitted to appoint proxies to attend company meetings and to speak on their
behalf. In cases where directors abuse their powers and privileges,
these provisions will aid shareholders. From the public point of
view, however, the enlarged powers to be afforded the Board of
Trade to investigate the affairs of a company, whenever it considers it desirable in the community interest or is requested by a
responsible body of shareholders, are vastly important.
In framing its Report, the Company Law Amendment Committee has avoided making any proposal which would restrict
honest business management, and it has endeavored to provide
every possible impetus to increase publicity of financial facts. The
balancing of these objectives, each with its proper emphasis ana
with relation to the Nation's expanding peacetime economy, transforms what might otherwise have been a dry State Paper into a
well-conceived approach to the reform of major deficiencies in
prevailing Company Law. The incorporation of the Cohen Committee's recommendations in British statutory law should be facilitated both by their moderate tone and by the gravity of the business, accounting, financial and managerial weaknesses they seek
to correct.

